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NOTES
Recent Developments Concerning Constitutional
Limitations on State Defamation Laws
I. INTRODUCTON
Two recent cases, New York Times Co. v. SullivanA and Garrison
v. Louisiana,2 have over-turned many aspects of state laws regarding
the defamation of public officials. The importance of these two cases
is due not only to the problems they have solved, but also to the
potential confusion which they have created. The primary purpose
of this discussion is to point out the practical effect which the decisions
will have on state law, both statutory and decisional. This note is
concerned primarily with those aspects of the law of defamation
dealing specifically with the conditional or qualified privilege to
criticize the official acts and qualifications of public officials and candi-
dates. Several questions in this specific area are left unresolved by
Sullivan and Garrison: (1) What classes of people will be analogized
to public officials for the purposes of applying the rules announced
in Sullivan? (2) When will the criticism be deemed directed toward
the official conduct of the public official, rather than personal criticism,
in order for the defendant to gain the protection of Sullivan? (3)
Is the Sullivan privilege limited to the press or any other particular
class whose relationship to the public is such that a duty exists within
this class to inform the public, or is the privilege extended to all
members of society? (4) Can a state continue to use its prior defini-
tion of malice in cases where the defendant has made no misstate-
ments of fact but has only commented harshly on true facts? (5) Is
the distinction between fact and comment abolished? (6) What is the
proper instruction to the jury in a case involving both fair comment
and misstatements of fact? (7) In order for the plaintiff to defeat
the defendant's qualified privilege, is it necessary that plaintiff prove
"actual malice" only by a mere preponderance of the evidence or must
he show this actual malice by "clear and convincing proof'? (8) If
plaintiff's burden is that of presenting "clear and convincing proof,"
what will be the practical effect of this change, especially in relation
to the propriety of directed verdicts for the defendant both at the
trial and appellate level? (9) What is the proper standard for de-
termining if there has been a reckless disregard for the truth?
The true significance of these two decisions cannot be appreciated
without a thorough examination of the prior law. After first examining
the Sullivan and Garrison decisions, the prior state law will be
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
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discussed, concluding with several predictions concerning the effect
which Sullivan and Garrison will have on state law.
II. THE DEcIsIoNs-New York Times Co. v. Sullivan Am
Garrison v. Louisiana
A. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
1. Statement.-Plaintiff, the elected police commissioner of Mont-
gomery, Alabama, brought a libel action against the defendant news-
paper3 seeking damages, both actual and punitive, of 500,000 dollars.
The action resulted from defendant's publication of an allegedly de-
famatory advertisement which contained several inaccurate state-
ments,4 most of which were relatively minor. There was evidence that
defendant's secretary believed the advertisement to be "substantially
correct,"5 but it was proved that defendant could have checked on the
truthfulness of the advertisement by looking into its own files, and
thereby could have discovered the inaccuracies. 6
The Alabama Supreme Court held that the publication was libelous
per se, and no actual malice need be proved by plaintiff since de-
fendant was unable to prove the truth of the statements. 7 Defendant,
after having failed to show the absolute truth of the advertisement,
sought the relief afforded by the fair comment privilege. This fair com-
ment privilege has been defined as a qualified privilege which is
extended to criticism of any public figure or public concern.8 It has
generally been limited to an honest expression of the writer's opinion
and has not been extended to good faith misstatements of fact.'
3. The action was also brought against four Alabama clergymen who allegedly spon-
sored the advertisement. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 256.
4. The inaccuracies can be listed as follows: "(1) The dining hall was never
padlocked. (2) The students did not refuse to re-register. (3) Less than the entire
student body protested. (4) The student leaders were not expelled for the protest
on the capital steps. (5) The police at no time literally ringed the campus. (6) Al-
though the police did appear near the campus on three occasions, it was never in
connection with the protest at thae capitol. (7) Dr. King had not been arrested seven
times. (8) The charge that Dr. King was assaulted was flimsy and was based on a
simple controverted instance of some years before." Kalven, The New York Times Case:
A Note on The Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 1964 Sup. CT. RBv. 191,
199. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 258-59. For a copy of
the advertisement referred to, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, fol-
lowing 292.
5. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 286.
6. Id. at 287.
7. Id. at 262.
8. See PRossm?, TORTs § 110, at 812-14 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Pnossra]
for a list of such subjects of public concern. See also notes 101-09 infra.
9. GATLEY, LxrEL Ais SLArimE 354 (4th ed. 1953). Dean Prosser, who refers to
both the fair comment privilege and the conditional privilege to assert misstatements
of fact as the privilege of public interest or discussion, states that "three-fourths of
the state courts which have considered the question have held the privilege of
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However, a minority of courts have extended the privilege to good
faith misstatements of fact which attack public officials" and candi-
dates." This extension of the fair comment privilege has often been
referred to as the conditional privilege to assert good faith mis-
statements of fact.12 But the Alabama Court followed the majority
view which refuses to recognize a conditional privilege to assert mis-
statements of fact, 3 and also followed the established test that the
defense of truth under the fair comment privilege must be measured
by the strictest of standards. 14 The effect of this ruling was to leave
the defendant with neither the fair comment privilege nor the condi-
tional privilege to assert misstatements of fact to rely on as a defense.
The jury was instructed that punitive damages could be awarded
even if plaintiff's allegations of actual damage were not proved.' 5
The jury was required to find only two elements to hold defendant
liable: (1) that the defendant published the article and, (2) that the
statements were made "of and concerning the plaintiff."16 The jury
returned a verdict for the requested amount, 500,000 dollars.'
7
2. Opinion.-Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court of the United
States on the ground that it had been denied its first amendment rights
of freedom of the press as protected against state action by the four-
public discussion is limited to opinion, comment or criticism, and does not extend to
any false assertion of facts." ProssEa § 110, at 814.
10. Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440
(1955); Salinger v. Cowles, 195 Iowa 873, 191 N.W. 167 (1922); Coleman v. Mac-
Lennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908); Stixe v. Beacon Newspaper Corp., 185
Kan. 61, 340 P.2d 396 (1959); Lawrence v. Fox, 357 Mich. 134, 97 N.W.2d 719
(1959); Clancy v. Daily News Corp., 202 Minn. 1, 277 N.W. 264 (1938); Ponder v.
Cobb, 257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67 (1962). "In general, a conditional privilege exists
in any situation where there is a legal or moral duty to speak out, so that the pub-
lisher's conduct comes within accepted standards of decency and is not mere gossip."
Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 CoLmTJ. L. IMv. 875, 889
(1949) [hereinafter cited as Defamation of Public Officers]. See RESTAT mNT,
Tors § 598, comment b (1938), for a view which would allow the conditional
privilege only if there was a sufficient public interest to make the publication neces-
sary. See also PRossan § 110, at 815.
11. Coleman v. MacLennan, supra note 10 (plaintiff was a candidate for reelection).
12. See Defamation of Public Officers, at 888. For purpose of clarity in this article,
a distinction will be made between the fair comment privilege and the conditional
privilege to assert good-faith misstatements of fact.
13. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 262. For a list of states which
have adhered to this majority view, see Defamation of Public Officers, at 896 n.102.
14. Johnson Publishing Co. v. Davis, 271 Ala. 474, 494-95, 124 So. 2d 441, 457-58
(1960); Sharpe v. Stevenson, 34 N.C. 239 (1851); Kilian v. Doubleday & Co., 367 Pa.
117, 79 A.2d 657 (1951).
15. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 675, 144 So. 2d 25, 39 (1962).
"The advertisement being libelous per se, it was not necessary to allege special
damages in the complaint."
16. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 262.
17. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 15.
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teenth amendment.'8 The defendant alleged that the awarding of the
libel judgment was state action within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment. 19 The Supreme Court of the United States held for the
defendant, reversing the state court judgment. A newspaper does not
forfeit its constitutional right to freedom of the press by publishing an
advertisement attacking the official conduct of a public official merely
because it contains good faith misstatements of fact and/or because
of its defamatory nature toward the official.20 To defeat the condi-
tional or qualified privilege to make statements concerning a public
official, the plaintiff public official must prove that the misstatements
were made with "actual malice," i.e., that the statement was pub-
lished "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
of whether it was false or not."2' Plaintiff also has the burden of
presenting evidence of this actual malice with "convincing clarity."22
The Court went on to hold that this constitutional protection would
likewise apply to defamatory attacks on certain agencies of govern-
ment where the complaint is brought by the official in charge of that
branch of government.2s
3. Raiionale.-The Court began its opinion by disposing of plaintiff's
argument that the granting of damages for libel was not state action,
making it very emphatic that this was an exercise of a "state rule
of law" which imposed unconstitutional restrictions on the freedom of
speech and the press; the fourteenth amendment applies to an exercise
of state power regardless of the form it takes.24 Next, the argument
of plaintiff that there is no constitutional protection for libell was
18. "'We are required in this case to determine for the first time the extent to
which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award
damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his offleial
conduct." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 256.
19. Id. at 265. The Court accepted this contention by stating: "The test is not
the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether
such power has in fact been exercised." Ibid.
20. Id. at 254-55.
21. Id. at 280.
22. "[W]e consider that the proof presented to show actual malice lacks the
convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands." Id. at 285-86.
23. "We hold that such a proposition [the Alabama Court's view that attacks on
the government body will be transmuted into personal attacks on the officials of that
body] may not constitutionally be utilized to establish that an otherwise impersonal
attack on governmental operations was a libel of an official responsible for those opera-
tions." Id. at 292.
24. Id. at 265. See also note 19 supra.
25. The Supreme Court of the United States had made previous statements to the
effect that libel can claim no constitutional protection. See Konigsberg v. State Bar,
366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 48
(1961); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348-49 (1946);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
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rejected by the Court. "[L]ibel can claim no talismanic immunity
from constitutional limitations."2 6 The Court referred to several state
statutes which restricted individual expression that the Court had
previously held unconstitutional, 27 and classified Alabama's libel law
within the same category.28 This analysis sufficiently foreclosed the
argument that libel was beneath constitutional protection.29
Mr. Justice Brennan expressed the basic rationale of the opinion
when he stated:
We consider this case against the background of a profound national com-
mitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. 30
This rationale is premised on the policy that the free interchange of
ideas and public discussion is the basic structure on which our
democratic government is built, and any restriction of this "opportu-
nity for free political discussion"3' would be highly detrimental to
our democracy. The Court went on to adopt the reasoning of those
state courts which have adhered to what was a minority view, 2 as
expressed by Judge Edgerton in Sweeney v. Patterson: "The interest
of the public here outweighs the interest of appellant or any other
individual."3 If the defendant must guarantee the truth of all his
factual assertions, the result will be a "self censorship" by which
critics will be forced to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone,"3
restricting the variety of public discussion.
26. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 269.
27. Among the previous state judgments which were struck down were: a civil
contempt judgment based on an out of court publication criticizing the decision of a
judge, Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941); a criminal conviction for violation of a state statute designed to prevent
the incitement of insurrection [unless the inciting statements cause a reasonable appre-
hension of danger to organized government], Hemdon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242
(1936); a criminal conviction for violation of a state law holding it illegal for groups
to assemble as a Communist organization, Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1936);
a criminal conviction for breach of the peace resulting from defendants' action of
marching around the state house and strongly voicing their views on integration,
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1962).
28. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 269.
29. "It [libel] must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment."
Ibid.
30. Id. at 270.
31. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
32. For a list of states following the minority view, see New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, supra note 1, at 280 n.20. For a discussion of the reasoning of the minority
view, see text accompanying notes 73-77 infra.
33. 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (speaking for a unanimous court in
dismissing a congressman's libel suit resulting from a newspaper article charging hith
with anti-Semitism).
34. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1947). See also New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 279.
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The Court also seemed to buttress its decision with the rule laid
down in Barr v. Matteo:35 statements made by a federal public official
are absolutely privileged if made "within the outer perimeter" of his
duties if the public official is sued for libel by a private citizen.36 It
seems that a majority of the states have adopted either this or a
similar rule which holds that the official's statements are protected
unless the plaintiff can prove the defendant public official made the
statement with actual malice.37 There was an implication that the
public would be discriminated against if it were not allowed the
same or a similar immunity as the public official. In making the
comparison between the citizen and public official, the opinion stated:
"Analogous considerations support the privilege for the citizen-critic
of government. It is as much his duty to criticize as it is the official's
duty to administer."38
B. Garrison v. Louisiana
1. Statement.-The defendant was convicted of criminal defama-
tion under the Louisiana Criminal Libel Statute;39 which statute
denied the defense of truth if the statements were made with actual
malice,40 as defined in previous Louisiana decisions as "hatred, ill will,
enmity, or a wanton desire to injure."41 The statute also punished
false statements made with ill will or made without a reasonable
belief in their truth.4 The conviction was the result of defendant's
allegedly defamatory criticism of eight judges of the criminal district
court.43 Defendant was convicted on the trial court's finding that the
statements were made with ill will and also that they were not made
with a reasonable belief in their truth.44
35. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
36. Id. at 575.
37. 1 HARPER & JAm2s, TORTS § 523, at 429-30 (1956). For a recent case upholding
this rule, see Vigoda v. Barton, 204 N.E.2d 441 (Mass. 1965).
38. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 282-83. "It would give public
servants an unjustified preference over the public they serve, if critics of official
conduct did not have a fair equivalent of the immunity granted to the officials
themselves" Ibid.
39. LA. REv. STAT. ANr. § 14:4749 (1950). For a reprinting of these applicable
sections, see Garrison v. Louisiana, supra note 2, at 65.
40. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:48 (1950). "Where such a publication or expression
is true, actual malice must be proved in order to convict the offender."
41. State v. Cox, 246 La. 748, 756, 167 So. 2d 352, 355 (1964); Bennett, The
Louisiana Criminal Code, 5 LA. L. ILEv. 6, 34 (1942).
42. LA. REv. STAT..ANN. § 14:49(2) (1950).
43. The most stringent of the accusations was: "This raises interesting questions
about the racketeer influences on our eight vacation-minded judges." Garrison v.
Louisiana, supra note 2, at 66.
44. Id. at 78. "The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction solely on the
ground that the evidence sufficed to support the trial court's finding of ill-will,
emnity, or a wanton desire to injure. But the trial court also rested the conviction
1434 [ VOL. 18
2. Opinion.-Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court of the United
States for a writ of certiorari on grounds that he had been deprived
of his constitutional rights of freedom of speech which had been
established in Sullivan. The Supreme Court reversed the Louisiana
conviction holding that the Louisiana Criminal Libel Statute is
unconstitutional for two reasons: first, it punishes true statements
made with malice in violation of the first amendment protection of
freedom of speech which makes truth an absolute defense to an
action for libel brought by a public official; second, it punishes false
statements made with ill will in derogation of the rules laid down in
Sullivan.4
3. Rationale.-The Court relied upon the same basic rationale as
that used in Sullivan, giving a more far-reaching effect to the concept
that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-
open... ."46 and that any restrictions on this debate should be struck
down. Plaintiff only has protection from and a remedy against the
calculated falsehood or deliberate lie.47
III. THE LAW PR oR TO Sullivan AND Garrison
The significance of these two cases becomes much clearer after an
examination of prior state law in this area. Both the courts and text-
writers have seemed unable to cope with the problems of the
qualified privilege. They have insisted on making narrow distinctions
in cases where no reason for the distinctions has existed. Very little,
if any, uniformity has been achieved among the states and confusion
has existed. Defamation of public officials has been treated much the
same as defamation of public figures by some courts while other courts
have attempted by different methods to broaden the privilege enjoyed
by the critic of government and the public official. Yet, other courts
have restricted the privilege, while seeming to ignore the first
amendment. This discussion will try to point out the distinctions and
problems with which the courts have become entangled, so as to
illustrate the ultimate importance of Sullivan and Garrison.
A. Fair Comment and the Conditional Privilege
Courts have persisted in making distinctions between the defense
on additional findings that the statement was false and not made in the reasonable
belief of its truth." Ibid.
45. Garrison v. Louisiana, supra note 2.
46. See note 30 supra.
47. Garrison v. Louisiana, supra note 2, at 75. "Calculated falsehood falls into that
class of utterances which 'are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality . . .
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572." Ibid.
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of fair comment and the defense of the conditional privilege to assert
good faith misstatements of fact. Fair comment has been generally
defined as a qualified privilege extended to all members of society
48
to offer any comment or opinion about any public figure or subject
of public concern,49 provided that the comment be the honest
expression of the writer's opinion-and that it be made with proper
motives and for justifiable ends.5"
The conditional privilege to assert good faith misstatements of fact
can generally be defined as a qualified privilege which is restricted to
criticism of government or public officials.51 This privilege has been
held to be defeasible if the defendant did not have a reasonable belief
in the truth of the erroneous statements, or if the statements were
made with an improper motive.
52
The basic difference between the two is that the fair comment
privilege has not been restricted to statements about government and
public officials or candidates as is the conditional privilege for mis-
statements of fact;53 rather the fair comment privilege has been
extended to any criticism directed at a subject of public concern,
i.e., educational, charitable, and religious institutions or artistic, liter-
ary, and athletic activities.54 Dean Prosser contends that the two
privileges are one in the same: the privilege to assert misstatements
of fact is merely an extension of the fair comment privilege., No
matter what label is used to describe the privilege, "actual malice" will
defeat either the fair comment privilege or the conditional privilege
to assert misstatements of fact.5 6 The problem here is: what definition
48. See note 10 supra.
49. See note 8 supra.
50. 'It [the comment] must, furthermore, represent the commentator's honest
opinion, and be published, in part at least, for the bona fide purpose of giving the
public the benefit of comment which it is entitled to have, rather than any ulterior
motive of causing harm to the plaintiff." Pnossun § 110, at 816. See also Friedell
v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 203 N.W. 974 (1925).
51. See notes 10-11 supra.
52. See Defamation of Public Officers, at 890. See also Ranson v. West, 125 Ky. 457,
101 S.W. 885 (1907), for a case holding that the privilege will not be allowed unless
defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that the statements were true. Other
courts have required only that the defendant have a good faith belief in the truth
of the statements no matter how unreasonable the belief might have been. Hallen,
Character of Belief Necessary for the Conditional Privilege in Defamation, 25 ILL. L.
1Ev. 865, 871 (1931). Professor Noel would contend that defendant must have
acted as a reasonable man under the same circumstances. Defamation of Public
Officers, at 890. "Conditional privilege is defeated by the presence of an improper
purpose, and any purpose is regarded as improper except that of promoting the
interest for the protection of which the privilege is given." Id. at 889. See also PnossEn
§ 110, at 816.
53. See notes 8-11 supra.
54. See note 8 supra.
55. See ProssER § 110, at 814-16. See note 9 supra.
56. Note, 12 MiAmI L. RBv. 89, 94 (1958).
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of actual malice will be applied in determining whether the privilege
is defeated?
All jurisdictions have recognized the fair comment privilege in one
form or another, while only a minority have recognized the conditional
privilege for misstatements of fact as defined above.5 7 The Sullivan
decision vindicates this minority view, accepting some of its qualifica-
tions while rejecting others.
B. Misstatements of Fact-Decisions and Policy
There has been a sharp conflict among the courts as to whether
defamatory misstatements of fact, made in good faith with a rea-
sonable belief in the truth of the statements concerning a public official
or candidate for public office, will be privileged. The large majority
of courts have held that any misstatement of fact, notwithstanding
that it was made with a good faith belief in its truth, will not be
protected; and the defense extends only to comment or opinion on
true facts. 8
In those jurisdictions which followed the majority view, the dis-
tinction between fact and comment attained its ultimate importance.
In most cases, the determination of whether a statement is "fact" or
"comment" is not difficult; however, in some cases it can be very
confusing, especially when the speaker's inference is so completely
unrelated to true facts actually stated that the reader must imply
that other facts existed which were not true. The best determinative
test appears to be what the ordinary reader would understand the
statement to be: either "an expression of the ... writer's opinions or
a directed statement of existing facts."59 The determination of this
issue, which could quite often have been the decisive factor in the
trial, was generally regarded as a question of law for the judge to
decide as long as the essential facts were uncontroverted. But the
jury should make the determination when the alleged comment im-
plied the existence of other untrue facts60 or where the facts were
57. See Defamation of Public Officers, at 896 n.102, for a list of states which have
refused to recognize the conditional privilege to assert misstatements of fact. See also
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 396 U.S. 254, 280 n.20 (1964), for a list of states
which have recognized the conditional privilege.
58. See note 57 supra. Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530 (6th Cir. 1893),
appears to be the leading case which followed the majority view.
59. Defamation of Public Officers, at 879. "'If one states that a candidate is a
thief, without qualifications, he communicates a fact,' and the statement is actionable
if untrue; but if he had 'stated the exact facts and expressed the opinion that they
amounted to stealing, though they did not technically constitute the offense of larceny,
the comment might be privileged."' Eikhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353, 360, 83 N.W.
110, 113 (1900).
60. The jury should determine if what appears to .be comment actually implies the
existence of facts which might be untrue. Van Arsdale v. Time, Inc., 35 N.Y.S.2d 951
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controverted.61 In most of those majority jurisdictions which refused
to recognize the conditional privilege to assert good faith misstate-
ments of fact, the defendant has carried the burden of proving that
his statements were comment rather than fact. In carrying this bur-
den, the defendant was required to affirmatively establish all the ele-
ments of the fair comment privilege 2 If the statements were held
to be facts rather than comment-either by the judge or juryO-de-
fendant was usually given the burden of establishing the truth of his
charge.6 But often this burden was not as strenuous as it appeared.
In one case where the plaintiff was accused of wasting 80,000 dollars
on a worthless project, although, in reality, only 17,500 dollars were
expended, the court held that the accusations were "substantially
true"; thus, the defendant was not held liable.65
The policy favored by the majority view has been protection for
the reputation of the individual, premised on the theory that erroneous
statements of fact would be much more harmful than mere harsh
comment which reasonable men would reject if the facts were
insufficient to support the inference.6 It was feared that the grave
risk of this potential threat to one's reputation would deter good
men from running for public office, leaving only those people with no
character to discredit as our public officials. It has also been con-
tended that this rule of strict liability for libelous falsehoods is needed
to protect the public from a "wayward press," to improve the standards
of our newspapers, and to provide society with a better informed
public.67 Another basis for the more rigid requirements of accuracy
on the part of the publisher is that newspapers can obtain liability in-
(Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd mem., 265 App. Div. 919, 39 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1st Dep't 1942);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 618, comment b (1934).
61. Bodine v. Times-Journal Publishing Co., 26 Okla. 135, 110 Pac. 1096 (1910));
Switzer v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 119 S.C. 237, 112 S.E. 110 (1922). See note 63
infra.
62. PnossER § 111, at 823. One requirement of the fair comment privilege being
that no misstatements of fact were made.
63. There was a great amount of confusion on this issue with some commentators
contending that is a question for the jury even though the facts are uncontroverted.
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 618(2) (1938), takes the view that "the jury determines
whether criticism was merely the expression of an opinion upon known facts or upon
a true or privileged statement of fact or whether it carried with it a false implication
of defamatory facts and whether it represented the honest opinion of its author and
whether it was expressed for a proper purpose."
64. RmATEMENT, TORTS § 613(2) (a) (1938). However, in Missouri, in cases
involving defamation of public officials or candidates, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving that the statements were false. Kleinschmidt v. Johnson, 183 S.W.2d 82 (Mo.
1944).
65. Fort Worth Press Co. v. Davis, 96 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
66. Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HARv. L. REv. 412, 419 (1910).
67. Note, 12 MrLAsi L. REv. 89, 102 (1958). This theory proposed that a more
responsible press would lead to a more accurate reporting of the news.
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surance for defamation and pass this added cost on to the advertiser
or subscriber, therefore leaving the press with no financial burden and
still providing the public official with the protection he justly de-
serves.
68
A minority of the courts and most of the commentatorsi have agreed
that defamatory misstatements of fact, made with a reasonable belief
in their truth, should be privileged69 on the condition that defendant's
accusations were not made with "actual malice."70 There has been a
divergence of opinion as to who has the burden of proving "actual
malice," but the better view would place the burden on the plaintiff.
71
Yet, the defendant must affirmatively establish his privilege by show-
ing a public interest sufficient to justify the privilege.72
The basic rationale supporting this minority view is that our society
and government will suffer if the discussion and debate on public
officials and candidates is restrained by the potential threat of a
large libel judgment. It is also urged that the limited protection
from libel suits offered by the majority view fails to balance ade-
quately the competing interests of the public to be fully informed
and of the individual to have his reputation protected from asserted
falsehoods because it fails to give sufficient weight to the interest of
the public to be fully informed. 3 It has been contended that the
interests can best be balanced by holding the publisher to a higher
standard of care in ascertaining the truth of the defamatory publica-
tion, and by relieving him of liability for good faith misstatements
of fact made after a thorough investigation.74 If the defendant must
make all statements of fact at his peril, there is a grave risk that
"many dark spots in the lives of public officers and candidates will
remain unilluminated," and the popular politician, even though dis-
honest and corrupt, will be protected.7 5 Advocates of the minority
view have also argued that there appears to be no decline in the
68. Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69 Ht.v. L. 1Ev. 875, 906 (1956).
See id. at 914, for a discussion of defamation insurance.
69. A list of the states and commentators who adhere to the minority view is found
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 n.20 (1964).
70. For a discussion of the numerous definitions of actual malice and the problems
created thereby, see text accompanying notes 84-97 infra.
71. "In an action for defamation the plaintiff has the burden of proving . . .
(g) abuse of a conditional privileged occasion." RE -TEmENT, TORTS § 613(1)(g)
(1938). See comment f of this section for reasons sufficient to hold that the privilege
has been abused. For all practical purposes actual malice must be given the same
meaning as the abuse of privilege "because the defamatory matter was published for
some purpose other than that for which the particular privilege is given." PFSTATE-
marers, ToRTs § 613, comment f (1938). See note 90 infra.
72. RESTAT=ENT, TonTs § 613(2)(B) & (C) (1938).
73. Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908).
74. 24 MnqN. L. REv. 620 (1940).
75. Defamation of Public Officers, at 892. -
1965 ] NOTES 1439
1440 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [ VOL. 18
quality of public officials and candidates in those states which have
adopted the minority's view limiting libel actions brought by public
officials.76 Criticism has also been directed toward the belief that
factual misstatements are more injurious to the plaintiff than mere
comment, the theory being that the average reader will not stop to
determine whether the statement is fact or comment and then base
his belief in the statement on this determination. 
7
Moreover, the minority view which grants a qualified privilege
for good-faith misstatements of fact has taken various forms. One
court has held that the conditional privilege applies only to mis-
statements made about the public acts of public oficials and not mere
candidates for public office, relying on the theory that an official
should be held to a higher standard of care and his duty to the
public is increased once he assumes his office.78 Two older decisions
have taken the contrary view, allowing the conditional privilege only
for falsehoods about candidates, relying on the belief that elected
officials need greater protection than the candidate. 9
Three other theories which have provided the defendant with
protection greater than that granted by the strict majority view have
been advanced. The first of these was the 'ibel per se" rule: if
extrinsic facts must be shown to make the words appear defamatory,
then the statements are not libelous "on their face" and plaintiff must
plead and prove "special damages" as a condition to recovery."0
"Special damages," which refer to a pecuniary loss such as loss of
customers or employment, are often difficult, if not impossible, to
prove.81 It appears that this "libel per se" theory, which was adopted
in only one state, has now been abandoned.82
A second theory advanced was the "public official rule" which
provided for no liability for a defamatory misstatement unless the
assertion was of such a nature that it would require plaintiff's removal
from office if it were true.83 This rule also has received very limited
76. Id. at 895.
77. "Statement[s] of fact, inferences therefrom, comments, criticism and the opinion
of a writer are frequently so blended in a writing that a demarcation between them
is difficult to draw." Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 300, 27 S.E.2d
837,841-42 (1943).
78. Id. at 303, 27 S.E.2d at 842-43.
79. State v. Fish, 91 N.J.L. 228, 102 AtI. 378 (1917); Commonwealth v. Wardwell,
136 Mass. 164, 169 (1883).
. 80. See Carpenter, Libel Per Se in California and Some Other States, 17 So. CAL.
L. Ray. 347, 356-67 (1944); 26 IowA L. BEv. 893, 895 (1941).
81. Defamation of Public Officers, at 901.
82. Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Publishing Corp., 242 N.Y. 208, 151 N.E. 209
(1926).
83. Sweeney v. Caller-Times Publishing Co., 41 F. Supp. 163 (S.D. Tex. 1941);
Tanzer v. Crawley Publishing Corp., 240 App. Div. 203, 205, 268 N.Y. Supp. 620, 622
(4th Dep't 1934); Cotulla v. Kerr, 74 Tex. 89, 94, 11 S.W. 1058, 1059 (1889).
application and support because of its unjustness in condoning the
publication of malicious misstatements of fact which were very detri-
mental to the official's reputation, though falling short of a sufficient
justification for removal from office.
A third theory was adopted by the Missouri courts which, although
not allowing a privilege for misstatements of fact, placed the burden
of proving the falsity of the statements on the plaintiff once defendant
had established the presence of the public interest requisite for the
defense.8 This theory has some merit in avoiding the worst of both
the strict majority and minority views in that defendant is not forced
to prove the truth of his statements, and plaintiff is not forced to
prove the defendant's bad faith or negligence.8 5
The relevance of these variations from the strict majority or minority
view is to point out the obvious dissatisfaction with both, and the
different compromising theories which have been employed to remedy
the conflict.
C. Definitions of Actual Malice
The numerous definitions of actual malice and their application
have been responsible for much of the confusion which has prevailed
in the law of defamation. To illustrate one of the significant areas of
the Sullivan decision, these older definitions must be examined.
The distinction between "actual malice" and "legal malice" must
first be established in order to avoid confusion.86 Legal malice is the
fictional term8 7 which is implied by law when defendant makes an
unprivileged defamatory statement about plaintiff even though the
defendant harbored no ill will toward the plaintiff and also had an
honest belief that the statements were true.88 Legal malice is "implied
as a disguise for strict liability in any case of unprivileged defama-
tion."89 Defendant has the burden of rebutting this fiction by proving
that the words were not defamatory on their face.
"Actual malice" becomes important when the defendant sufficiently
establishes a privileged occasion for making the statement. It is
similar to the allegation of "abuse of privilege"90 which plaintiff must
84. Kleinschmidt v. Johnson, supra note 64.
85. Developments in the Law of Defamation, supra note 68, at 928 n.357.
86. Cases illustrating the distinction are: Iverson v. Frandsen, 237 F.2d 898 (10th
Cir. 1956); Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 86 N.W. 323 (1901).
87. Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908).
88. Hoffman v. Trenton Times, 17 N.J. Misc. 339, 8 A.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. 1939);
PoossEn § 108, at 790-91.
89. PaossER § 110, at 821.
90. "Abuse of privilege" is the term generally referred to as meaning excessive pub-
lication, use of the privilege for an improper purpose, or a failure of defendant to
believe in the truth of the statements made. See RESTATEmmNT, ToRTS § 613, comment
f (1938); PaossEa § 110, at 823.
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prove to defeat the qualified privilege. 91 Put in simpler terms, when
the occasion is privileged, plaintiff has the burden of proving actual
malice to defeat the privilege; while in unprivileged occasion, de-
fendant must rebut the presumption of "legal malice."
It can be assumed that proof of "actual malice" will defeat both
the fair comment privilege and the qualified privilege to assert good
faith misstatements of fact.92 The real difficulty and confusion results
from the definition to be applied to the term. As related to the fair
comment privilege, Dean Prosser would discard the term "malice"
as meaningless and unsatisfactory, and apply the test of the Restate-
ment of Torts: "the privilege of fair comment is lost if the publication
is not made primarily for the purpose of furthering the interest which
is entitled to protection." 93 Other courts have stated that the privilege
is lost if the defendant acts from motives of "hatred, ill will or enmity
or a wanton desire to injure."94 It has also been said that the defama-
tory statement must be an honest expression of the writer's own
opinion.95
As related to the qualified privilege to assert misstatements of fact,
the privilege has been held to be lost if the defendant does not believe
in the truth of his statements, 96 or if defendant does not have
reasonable grounds or "probable cause" to believe that the statements
are true.97 Yet, some courts have held that statements made in good
faith will be privileged notwithstanding the unreasonableness of the
basis for believing the truth of the statements.98 Dean Prosser con-
tends that the defendant should be held to the standard of the rea-
sonable man under the same circumstances, giving heavy considera-
tion to the "strength of his belief, the grounds that he has to support
it, and the importance of conveying the information."99
The courts and commentators have persisted in making distinctions
as to what abuses will defeat the fair comment or qualified privilege
to assert misstatements of fact. Both the Sullivan and Garrison deci-
91. Cook v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 241 Mo. 326, 145 S.W. 480 (1912); RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 613(1)(9) (1938); PnossER § 110, at 819.
92. 12 MiAmi L. REv. 89, 94 (1958). For this purpose "actual" malice is given
the same meaning as the phrase "abuse of privilege" as used by the RESTATEMENT,
TORTS §§ 605, 613 (1938).
93. PROSSER § 110, at 822.
94. Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 197 P.2d 713 (1948);
Mullen v. Lewiston Evening Journal, 147 Me. 286, 86 A.2d 164 (1952).
95. Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 203 N.W. 974 (192,5); 1
HARPER & JAmES, TORTS § 457 (1956).
96. Caldwell v. Personal Fin. Co., 46 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1950); Froslee v. Lund's
State Bank, 131 Minn. 435, 155 N.W. 619 (1915).
97. Baskett v. Crossfield, 190 Ky. 751, 228 S.W. 673 (1920). Cf. Hogan v. New
York Times Co., 313 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1963).
98. A.B.C. Needlecraft Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, 245 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1957).
99. PRossEI § 111, at 822.
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sions have helped to abolish these distinctions and problem areas,
but they have the potential of creating new "gray areas" which will
undoubtedly lead to difficulties of interpretation by the state courts.
IV. PREDICTIONS ON THE FuTuRE EFFEct OF Sullivan AND Garrison
ON PRIOR STATE LAW
It can be assumed that the constitutional limitations announced in
Sullivan and Garrison supersede state law, both statutory and deci-
sional, and that state libel judgments must conform to these rules and
restrictions in order to achieve validity.10 The basic standards and
rules are set out in the decisions, but certain collateral issues are
susceptible of conflicting interpretations. It is the purpose of the
discussion in the remaining portion of this article to point out these
problem areas, to predict the ultimate effect of Sullivan and Garrison
on state law, and to formulate guidelines which may prove suggestive
to the judges and attorneys who must try defamation cases.
A. Who is a Public Official?
The qualified privilege of fair comment has generally been extended
to any matter of public concern which affects the interests of the
community as a whole, such as the administration of government,101
the qualifications of officials or candidates, 102 the management of in-
stitutions, such as schools103 and churches, 104 the conduct of a private
enterprise which affects the public interest, 0 5 the work of an individual
which is submitted to the public, 06 and exhibitions of art, 07 athletic' 08
or acting 19 abilities. The question remains: Do the extensions of the
100. The first amendment to the United States Constitution states that "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ..... U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The restraints imposed upon Congress by this amendment have
been applied to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 268 (1941); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925); Bartholomew, The Gitlow Doctrine Down to Date, 50 A.B.A.J. 139
(1964).
101. Swearingen v. Parkersburg Sentinel Co., 125 W. Va. 731, 26 S.E.2d 209 (1943)
(audit of city's books).
102. Catalfo v. Shenton, 102 N.H. 47, 149 A.2d 871 (1959) (Democratic State
Committee chairman).
103. Clark v. McBaine, 299 Mo. 77, 252 S.W. 428 (1923).
104. Klos v. Zahorik, 113 Iowa 161, 84 N.W. 1046 (1901).
105. Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440
(1955).
106. McCarthy v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 101 Ohio App. 297, 136 N.E.2d 393 (1956)
(submission of radio and T.V. programs).
107. Outcault v. New York Herald Co., 117 App. Div. 534, 102 N.Y.S. 685 (1907).
108. Cohen v. Cowles Publishing Co.,, 45 Wash. 2d 262, 273 P.2d 893 (1954)
(jockey's handling of a horse).
109. Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, supra note 86. See PROSSER § 110, at 812-14, for
other subjects of public interest sufficient to justify the fair comment privilege.
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privilege to misstatements of fact made by Sullivan apply only to
elected public officers, or do they also apply to these other areas of
legitimate public concern? Strictly construed, the decision is limited
to elected public officials, but the Court's language and the policy
which it promotes give the impression that Sullivan's misstatement
of fact doctrine should likewise be applied to candidates for public
office. 110 If the Sullivan rules are not applicable to candidates, the
rule would have the potential effect of discriminating against the
incumbent seeking re-election.
The Sullivan rule which allows a conditional privilege for misstate-
ments of fact about public officials made without actual malice is
certainly not extended to public figures outside the sphere of govern-
ment. It has been held not to apply to a former heavy-weight boxing
champion"' or to a major league baseball pitcher." 2 Since the
primary purpose espoused by Sullivan was the promotion of a
sound government and better officials as the end result of a better
educated public, it can be plausibly contended that only those per-
sons closely connected with government will fall within the rule for
only a valid public interest should outweigh the interest of the
individual's reputation. But the Alaska Superior Court has extended
the Sullivan rule to include attacks on critics of government as dis-
tinguished from public officials because the critic (here a news
columnist) became so infected with the best interests of government
that his protection from defamation should be no greater than that
of the public official." 3 It has also been suggested by Judge Friendly
of the Second Circuit that the constitutional privilege announced
in Sullivan could be properly extended to participants in any public
debate on issues which are of "grave public concern." n14
110. "Although the public official is the strongest case for constitutional compulsion
of such a privilege, it is questionable whether in principle the decision [New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan] can be so limited. A candidate for public office would seem an
inevitable candidate for extension; if a newspaper cannot constitutionally be held
for defamation when it states without malice, but cannot prove, that an incumbent
seeking re-election has accepted a bribe, it seems bard to justify holding it liable for
further stating that the bribe was offered by his opponent." Pauling v. News Syndicate
Co., 335 F.2d 659, 671 (2d Cir. 1964) (dictum). To support this theory that
the constitutional privilege of Sullivan is extended to candidates as well as elected
public officials, it should be noted that the Court cited with approval cases which had
previously granted the privilege for misstatements of fact about candidates. New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 n.20 (1964).
111. Dempsey v. Time, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 759, 252 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
112. Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S. 2d 529 (Sup. Ct.
1964).
113. Pearson v. Fairbanks Publishing Co., Civil No. 10,209, Super. Ct. of Alaska,
4th Dist., Nov. 25, 1964 appeal docketed, Civil No. 585, Sup. Ct. of Alaska.
114. Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., supra note 110, at 671. This view has been
criticized in Note, 51 VA. L. REv. 106, 113 (1965), as "an unjustified interpretation
of the Sullivan rationale."
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Any discussion as to how far down into the ranks of governmental
employees or officers the Sullivan rule extends would be purely spec-
ulative, for the Court specifically refrained from determining this
issue."5 However, an employee of a government body will be re-
stricted in bringing his libel action by the Sullivan rule no matter
how minor the governmental position he holds if the defamatory
attack is directed at the governmental body in which he holds a
position."6  If the attack is definitely personal, as opposed to an
attack on the governmental body, the best guideline or rule which
can be formulated in deciding if plaintiff is a "public official"117 is a
balancing of interests test. The interests of the individual's reputa-
tion must be weighed against the individual's relationship to govern-
ment and the value to sound government which is achieved by the
free discussion of the individuals qualifications for his governmental
duties." 8 This issue becomes very difficult in cases where the defamed
plaintiff is a "minor" official such as a member of the school board
or other municipal commission, a school principal, or a "white collar"
employee of the federal, state, or local government." 9 It is assumed
that state courts will give a liberal construction to the language of
Sullivan in cases where the plaintiff's importance in government
reaches a high level, and the damage to his reputation is relatively
small. The defendant has the burden of proving that the plaintiff
is a legitimate subject for his commentary, since this is one of the ele-
ments necessary to establish the privileged occasion. 20
115. "We have no occasion here to determine how far down into the lower ranks
of government employees the 'public official' designation would extend for purposes
of this rule [qualified privilege to assert good faith misstatements of fact], or other-
wise to specify categories of persons who would or would not be included." New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 110, at 283 n.23.
116. "The present proposition [the Alabama Supreme Court's contention that an
attack on a government body is an attack on the employees in charge of that agency]
would sidestep this obstacle by transmuting criticism of government, however im-
personal it may seem on its face, into personal criticism, and hence potential libel,
of the officials of whom the government is composed," and it "strikes at the very
center of the constitutionally protected area of free expression." Id. at 292.
117. This refers to the determinative issue of whether the Sullivan rule, which
allows the conditional privilege for misstatements not made with actual malice, will
apply.
118. "Here the rule by which privilege is to be measured is correctly stated, as
. . . the balance of public good against private hurt." Coleman v. MacLennan, 78
Kan. 711, 731, 98 Pac. 281, 288 (1908). The Court in Sullivan might have sub-
consciously applied this balancing test for it is certainly questionable whether plaintiff
suffered any appreciable amount of damage. See text accompanying note 162 infra.
119. See Sheridan v. Crisona, 14 N.Y.2d 108, 198 N.E.2d 359 (1964), for a recent
case enumerating a limited class of officials who would fall within Sullivan's constitu-
tional privilege.
120. If hInintiff was not a public official within the meaning of the Sullivan decision,
then the Sullivan rule on misstatements of fact will not apply, thereby leaving the
state courts unrestrained from following their previous defamation law on the issue
of liability.
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B. Criticism of Official Conduct
The Sullivan decision is restricted to criticism of the official conduct
of the public official, but the benefit of the Sullivan privilege is not
destroyed if the criticism also affects the private character of the
official.' 21 "Anything which might touch on an official's fitness for
office .. ." will be privileged, and this would include any attacks on
the official's alleged "dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motiva-
tion ... ."22 This language indicates that defendant should have
little difficulty in proving that the criticism was directed at plaintiff's
official conduct.
C. Defendants Who Can Rely on the Sullivan Privilege
It appears that the Sullivan privilege is not limited to the press or
any other particular category, but is extended to anyone who is in
the position to furnish information to the public concerning its
officials.'23 In a majority of jurisdictions the fair comment privilege
has been extended to the public and not limited to a certain group
who have a duty to inform the public, 24 and at least one court which
had previously adhered to the minority view-allowing a privilege for
good faith misstatements of fact-also did not limit the privilege to
the press, but seemed to extend the privilege to all members of
society.125 The constitutional guaranties announced in Sullivan are
derived from either the "freedom of speech" or "freedom of the press"
provisions of the first amendment, and it is quite obvious that the
Supreme Court did not intend to limit the privilege to the press since
an individual successfully relied on the privilege in Garrison.
12
D. Comment or Opinion
The effect of Sullivan and Garrison on state defamation laws dealing
specifically with comment or opinion is especially important, for if Sul-
livan applies only to defamatory statements of fact, a state court might
121. "The New York Times rule is not rendered inapplicable merely because an
official's private reputation, as well as his public reputation, is harmed." Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
122. Ibid.
123. The Sullivan opinion gave no indication that the privilege is restricted to the
press. The defendant can successfully rely on either the freedom of press or the
freedom of speech provision of the first amendment. See note 100 supra, for a re-
printing of the applicable phrases of the first amendment.
124. PRossER § 110, at 812.
125. Ponder v. Cobb, 257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67 (1962). Dean Prosser contends
that the conditional privilege to assert good faith misstatements of fact should be
extended to anyone "in a position to furnish information about public servants." PnossEn
§ 110, at 815.
126. Garrison v. Louisiana, supra note 121.
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label the defamatory remarks as comment or opinion and erroneously
disregard the constitutional standards announced in Sullivan. Although
the decision in Sullivan did not turn on this fair comment issue, the
Court did express its view on this matter by stating in a footnote to the
opinion that the first and fourteenth amendments allow the defense
of fair comment for an honest expression of opinion which is based
on "privileged, as well as true, statements of fact" to be defeated only
by a showing of actual malice.127 Although the Court in Garrison
specifically refrained from reaching a decision on this issue of a state's
power to award damages for harsh defamatory comment alone,128
the Court did give a good indication of its view on this issue by
adopting the language of State v. Burnham:129
If upon a lawful occasion for making a publication, he has published the
truth, and no more, there is no sound principle which can make him liable,
even if he was actuated by express malice .... It has been said that it is
lawful to publish truth from good motives, and for justifiable ends. But this
rule is too narrow. If there is a lawful occasion-a legal right to make a
publication-and the matter true, the end is justifiable, and that, in such
case, must be sufficient.130
This language furnishes a strong indication that the statutes of a
majority of the states which make truth a defense only if the state-
ments are made "with good motives and for justifiable ends" are in-
valid. 3' If truth constitutes an absolute privilege or defense,' 32 it is
easily implied that no remedy will be allowed for honest comment
based upon true facts no matter how vituperative the comment may
be.133 Although this decision is directed at a state's punishment for
criminal libel, it is inferred that the rules announced here will apply
equally well to actions for civil libel.1'
127. Since the fourteenth amendment requires recognition of the conditional
privilege for honest misstatements of fact, it follows that a defense of fair comment
must be afforded for honest expression of opinion based upon privileged, as well as
true statements of fact. Both defenses are of course defeasible if the public official
proves actual malice, as was not done here." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra
note 110, at 292 n.30 (emphasis added).
128. "In view of our result, we do not decide ...whether a State may provide'
any remedy, civil or criminal, if defamatory comment alone, however vituperative, is
directed at public officials." Garrison v. Louisiana, supra note 128, at 76 n.10.
129. State v. Burnham, 9 N.H. 34,43-44, 31 Am. Dec. 217 (1837).
130. Id. at 42-43, 31 Am. Dec. at 221; quoted in Garrison v. Louisiana, supra note
121, at 73.
131. Id. at 70. For a list of such state statutes which negate the truth defense if
the statements are not published "with good motives and for justifiable ends," see
Garrison v. Louisiana, supra note 121, at 70 n.7.
132. "Truth may not be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions where dis-
cussion of public affairs is concerned." Id. at 74.
133. This implication appears to be valid, but it must be noted that the Court in
Garrison specifically reserved judgment on this issue. See note 128 supra.
134. "What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal
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The granting of a qualified privilege for harsh comment based on
good faith misstatements of fact as opposed to comment based on
true facts is a more radical position. However, the Court in Sullivan
indicated that this position would be taken.135 Since the Court failed
to explain the method of determining whether the misstatement of
fact is privileged, it must be assumed that the Court intended that the
misstatement would be privileged unless it was made with actual
malice, as defined in the Sullivan decision: "vith knowledge that it
[the misstatement of fact on which the comment was based] was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."13
The defense of fair comment would therefore not be defeated if the
plaintiff merely proved that the defendant was motivated by ill will,
hatred, a desire to injure, or an improper purpose as many state courts
have frequently held.13 7 If this proposed theory of fair comment is
carried to its ultimate conclusion, evidence of ill will or a desire to
injure would be admissible only for the purpose of determining
punitive damages, if, in fact, the privilege were disallowed because of
defendant's reckless disregard for the truth, since evidence of malice
would have no probative value in determining the reasonableness of
defendant's belief in the truth of his statements. The Garrison opinion
strengthens this evidence argument by stating that there must be
an intent to injure the plaintiff by falsehood in order to hold the
defendant liable rather than merely "an intent to inflict harm."13
This is unquestionably a revolutionary idea which provides protection
for the plaintiff only against defendant's "calculated falsehood" or the
statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel." New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, supra note 110, at 277. Cf., Farmers Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525, 535
(1958).
135. See note 127 supra.
136. See note 21 supra.
137. PaossEn § 110, at 819-21.
138. "Debate on public issues will not be uninhibited if the speaker must run the
risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of hatred; even if he did speak
out of hatred, utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas
and the ascertainment of truth. Under a rule like the Louisiana rule, permitting a
finding of malice based on an intent merely to inflict harm, rather than an intent
to inflict harm through falsehood, 'it becomes a hazardous matter to speak out against
a popular politician, with the result that the dishonest and incompetent will be shielded
.... Moreover, [i]n the case of charges against a popular political figure ... it may be
almost impossible to show freedom from ill-will or selfish political motives.'" Garrison
v. Louisiana, supra note 121, at 73-74. The Supreme Court has supported this language
in the Garrison decision by reversing two state court decisions in which the jury had
been instructed that they could "infer malice... from the falsity and libelous nature of
the statement, although malice as a legal presumption does not arise from the fact that
the statement in question is false or libelous." The basis for the reversal was the fact
that the "jury might well have understood these instructions to allow recovery on a
showing of an intent to inflict harm, rather than an intent to inflict harm through false-
hood." Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965).
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known or deliberate lie.139 It may be contended that the Court did not
intend its language to be interpreted in such a revolutionary manner,
but the two decisions read together certainly seem to lean toward this
result.
It is proposed that comment on true or privileged statements of
fact is privileged, but it must be noted that this extended privilege
must still meet the requirement that the comment be an honest good-
faith expression of the publisher's opinion.140 Until the Supreme Court
provides some new standard or criterion to determine what is an
"honest expression" of the defendant's opinion, it can be assumed that
state courts can rely on their definitions of this term, as most states
have previously held that the opinion must be, in substance or practi-
cality, the honest opinion of the writer.'4' The majority of these
courts, in defining honest opinion, have required that the defendant
have a good faith, reasonable belief in the correctness of his opinion,
with the immunity not being forfeited merely because the inference
was incorrect, if the facts from which the opinion were drawn are
stated with the opinion. 42 This theory that honest comment based on
true or privileged facts will be immune from libel appears contrary to
the previous weight of authority since it has been formerly held that
the fair comment privilege is lost if the statements are not made
primarily to further the "interest which is entitled to protection,"143
or if defendant's primary motivation is ill will for the plaintiff144 Yet,
some courts have held that if the publication was made primarily for a
proper purpose, the additional fact that defendant desired to injure
the plaintiff or had enmity for him will not defeat the privilege.145
It must be pointed out, however, that the Sullivan and Garrison
liberalization of the fair comment rule applies only to the restricted
area of defamatory comment on the official acts of public officials,
and it has no relevance to public figures outside this narrow perimeter.
This new concept would appear to abolish, for the purpose of
attacks on public officials, the previous important distinctions between
139. "Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise
of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately
published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity." Garrison v. Louisiana,
supra note 121, at 75.
140. "[fIt follows that a defense of fair comment must be afforded for honest
expression of opinion . " New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 110, at 292
n.30 (emphasis added.)
141. 12 Mum L. REv. 89, 98 (1958).
142. GATLEY, LiEnr. AND SLAmDE 354 (4th ed. 1953).
143. PRossmi § 111, at 822.
144. Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791, 197 P.2d 713 (1948); Mullen
v. Lewiston Evening Journal, 147 Me. 286 A.2d 164 (1952).
145. Craig v. Wright, 182 Okla. 68, 76 P.2d 248 (1938); Evans, Legal Immunity for
Defamation, 24 Munq. L. :Ev. 607, 610 (1940).
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fact and opinion. This distinction was especially important in the
majority of jurisdictions which had restricted the qualified privilege
to comment or opinion and had not extended it to good faith mis-
statements of fact which were generally held libelous per se.146 No
longer will the determination of whether the statement is an opinion
or a fact have any real importance in the outcome of the case. For if
plaintiff alleges that falsehoods were stated, he must prove with
"convincing clarity" that the falsehoods were made with a "reckless
disregard" for their truth or falsity, and if plaintiff fails to carry his
burden of proof, the statements are privileged. Further, any comment
inferred from these facts should likewise be privileged ff the comment
is the "honest expression" of the writer's opinion.147 This theory is
entirely contrary to the standard or rule to which the courts and
textwriters have steadfastly adhered in the past: that in order for
comment or opinion to be privileged, it must be based on true facts
actually stated,148 but here again, it must be emphasized that this new
theory of liability would apply only to comment directed at the official
acts of public officials, for Sullivan and Garrison explicitly restrict
the application of their rules to this area.
If our examination of the Supreme Court's position on the concepts
mentioned above has been correct, then a judge's duty in instructing
the jury will be greatly simplified in cases where the defamatory
remarks consist of both misstatements of fact and harsh comment
based on either true facts or misstatements of fact, and most of the
defamation cases will probably consist of inter-connected comment
and misstatements of fact. It will not be necessary for the judge to
instruct the jury to apply one definition of "actual malice" to deter-
mine the liability for the misstatement of fact,149 and apply another
definition of "actual malice" to determine if the fair comment privilege
is defeated.150 The judge may simply charge the jury to determine
the fact issue of whether the defendant made the statements in reck-
less disregard of their truth, if he feels that plaintiff has presented
146. See note 57 supra.
147. See text accompanying notes 140-42 supra.
148. RESTATEmENr, TORTS § 606(1)(a)() & (ii) (1938). "Criticism of so much of
another's activities as are matters of public concern is privileged if the criticism,
although defamatory, (a) is upon (i) a true or privileged statement of fact, or (ii)
upon facts otherwise known or available to the recipient as a member of the pub-
lic .... ." The Sullivan rule of actual malice would make it much easier for the
court to hold the statement of fact, on which the opinion was based, as a privileged
statement of fact.
149. This refers to the Sullivan definition: "with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." See note 22 supra.
150. This refers to the definitions which state courts had previously applied to
determine if the fair comment privilege had been abused or defeated. See text
accompanying notes 86-99 supra.
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a fact issue sufficient to send to the jury.151 If the jury finds for the
defendant, then the misstatements of fact become privileged, and
the only question remaining is whether the comment was an honest
expression of the writer's opinion. If the jury finds for the defendant
on the issue of recklessness, it can be assumed that they would also
find that the comment was defendant's honest opinion, since it is
generally not required that the inference or opinion be reasonable,
only that it be honest.
15 2
E. Plaintiff's Burden of Proving Actual Malice
Both Sullivan and Garrison seem to imply that plaintiff's burden of
proving defendant's actual malice is not satisfied merely by proving
this issue by a preponderance of the evidence. This inference is
drawn from the statement in Garrison that "only those false state-
ments made with the high degree of awareness of their probable
falsity demanded by New York Times may be the subject of either
civil or criminal sanctions."15 3 This statement added to the phrase
used in Sullivan, "convincing clarity which the constitutional standard
demands"1'4 provides a strong argument that plaintiff must prove
defendant's actual malice by "clear and convincing proof." This
heavier burden should increase the number of directed verdicts for
defendants at the trial level. 15  The appellate court which has the
power to review the evidence de novo on the actual malice issue can
151. It is contended that numerous motions by defendant for directed verdicts will
be granted at this stage of the trial, since plaintiff will find it very dicult to prove
defendants' recklessness with "convincing clarity." See note 155 infra.
152. Developments in the Law of Defamation, 69 HAuv. L. REv. 875, 926 (1956).
"The courts agree that most statements of opinion based on inferences made in good
faith from true facts and concerning matters in the public interest are protected as
'fair comment' even though the inferences are unreasonable ..... See also REsTATE-
m~m, ToRTs § 606(1) (1938).
153. Garrison v. Louisiana, supra note 121, at 74.
154. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 110, at 285-86. "[W]e consider
that the proof presented to show actual malice lacks the convincing clarity which the
constitutional standard demands, and hence that it would not constitutionally sustain
the judgment for respondent [plaintiff] under the proper rule of law."
155. To point out the relevance of this increase in the burden of proof, the follow-
ing analogy might be helpful. If plaintiff's burden of proof is a "preponderance of the
evidence," the trial judge must submit the issue to the jury if only a small minority
of a certain number of people would believe the proposed fact to be true (20 out of a
possible 100). If plaintiff's burden is that of proving the truth of his proposition by
"clear and convincing evidence," then the judge should direct the verdict for the
defendant unless more than a majority of a certain number of people would believe
the proposed fact to be true (55 out of a possible 100). This standard is increased
greatly where the criminal standard, "beyond a reasonable doubt," is used. In making
his decision whether to direct the verdict or not, the judge must consider the standard
to be applied, the evidence introduced, and what a reasonable prudent man as a
juror would decide.
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also reverse if plaintiff fails to carry his burden of proving his case
by "clear and convincing proof."
156
F. Standard for Determining the Existence of a "Reckless
Disregard" for the Truth
The Court in Garrison expressly struck down the reasonable belief
test which the Louisiana court used to determine if the defendant
had made his statements with a reckless disregard of the truth.157
The Court expressly denied the test of "ordinary care" or that of the
"reasonable prudent man" and held that the defendant's privilege is
defeated only if he made the statement with a reckless disregard for
the truth.158 It seems that this term "reckless disregard" is closely
analogous to the concept of "gross negligence."15 9 In ascertaining the
standard for determining if there has been a reckless disregard for
the truth, previous definitions of the phrase "recklessness" must be
examined. Dean Prosser uses the term as meaning that the "actor
has intentionally done an act of unreasonable character in disregard
of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to have
been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that
156. The appellate court may do as the Supreme Court did in Sullivan (review the
evidence de novo) and reverse the case ordering the lower court to direct the verdict
for defendant. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on The Central Mean-
ing of the First Amendment, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191, 220.
157. Garrison v. Louisiana, supra note 121, at 79. See Baer v. Rosenblatt, 203 A.2d
773 (N.H. 1964) for a case which, even though acknowledging Sullivan, applied the
reasonable belief or reasonable grounds test and found defendant guilty, stating that
he [defendant] "gave no support for what he wrote." The Supreme Court of the
United States expressly rejected this reasonable belief test in Garrison, so it now
becomes necessary for state courts to abandon this test and formulate a new standard
to determine recklessness which will attain the Supreme Court's sanction. 379 U.S. at 79.
158. "The test which we laid down in New York Times is not keyed to ordinary
care; defeasance of the privilege is conditioned, not on mere negligence, but on
reckless disregard for the truth." Garrison v. Louisiana, supra note 121, at 79. It can
be assumed that a reckless disregard for the truth cannot be found merely because
of a failure to check readily available files, for in Sullivan, the Court held that the
evidence was not sufficient to support a finding of actual malice even though the
defendant could have ascertained the inaccuracies in the advertisement by checking
its files. If a failure to check readily available files is not a reckless disregard for the
truth, it appears that plaintiff's burden of proving actual malice could almost be
insurmountable absent a showing that defendant knew that the statement was false.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 110, at 287.
159. "There is no clear distinction at all between such conduct [reckless conduct]
and gross negligence, and the two have tended to merge and take on the same mean-
ing, of an aggravated form of negligence, differing in quality rather than in degree from
ordinary lack of care." See PRossER § 34, at 189. Gross negligence is sometimes de-
scribed as a lack of any care whatsoever or a failure to exercise that amount of care
which even a careless person would use. Growley v. Barto, 59 Wash. 2d 280, 367
P.2d 838 (1962).
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harm would follow ... with a conscious indifference to the conse-
quences." 60
The use of the recklessness or "gross negligence" standard rather than
the ordinary negligence standard has its significance in the inherent
distinctions between the two standards which courts have built up
in the past, and the explicit use of the new standard of recklessness
will tend to make the plaintiff's case much more difficult.
V. DIRECTON OF THE SUPREME COURT
In attempting to anticipate the direction in which the Court is
moving in this area, two important considerations must be examined
carefully. The first of these is the setting in which the Sullivan case
was decided. The turbulent situation giving rise to the litigation was
so strongly connected with the negro civil rights movement, which
is "making significant constitutional law not only in the area of the
fourteenth amendments equal protection clause but in unexpected
sectors of first amendment theory,"161 that one can contend that the
Sullivan decision was only a sensitive reaction to the Negro's protest
against the denial of his civil rights. The second consideration which
should be noted is that the alleged defamatory statements were
critical of plaintiff's segregation-minded conduct which probably
would have been approved by the majority of the constituents
within the plaintiff's locality. The Court could hardly provide plaintiff
with a remedy for defamation where the language used would actually
benefit the plaintiff in future elections, although it would not be
beneficial if made to "right-thinking people"; however, no court has
denied plaintiff's recovery specifically because the group of "right-
thinking people" was too small.162 So in a case such as Sullivan,
justice dictated that the Court find some ground for denying recovery
other than that only a probable minority of Alabamians would find
the statements defamatory.16 The Court was also confronted with
the fact that eleven additional libel suits were pending as a result of
the same advertisement involved in Sullivan, with the plaintiffs seek-
ing a total of 5,600,000 dollars in damages.' These considerations offer
160. PROSSER § 34, at 188-89.
161. Kalven, supra note 156, at 192.
162. Peck v. Tribune, 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909); Developments in the Law of
Defamation, supra note 152, at 886.
163. It is this writer's opinion that only a few Alabamians' would consider an
attack, which alleged that an official was a segregationist, as derogatory of the official's
character or reputation. "Montgomery [Alabama] is one of the localities in which
widespread hostility to desegregation has been manifested." New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 294 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 295.
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some indication that the Court was only responding "to the pressures
of the day created by the negro protest movement."165
One has to look no further than the two concurring opinions to find
that this was not merely a response to the negro movement, for
Justices Black, Goldberg, and Douglas, concurring, argued that the
"actual malice" limitation on the privilege to criticize public officials
is far too restrictive. Mr. Justice Black summed up his theory very
adequately, stating: "An unconditional right to say what one pleases
about public affairs is what I consider to be the minimum guarantee
of the first amendment."166 Under this view, plaintiff would have no
remedy for the deliberate or calculated lie. The concurring opinions
coupled with the later Garrison decision, which extended the Sullivan
decision to criminal libel and indicated further extensions within the
area of comment, refute any speculation that the Court has taken a
position in Sullivan which it will narrowly construe or from which
it will retreat. It should also be noted that the Court could have
decided the controversy in Sullivan strictly on the basis that the evi-
dence was inadequate to connect the plaintiff with the statements
asserted in the publication, for the Court found that the evidence was
insufficient to connect the plaintiff with the advertisement.6 By
refusing to reach the result on this issue alone, it becomes clear that
the Court was primarily concerned with abolishing seditious libel and
creating greater protection for "free speech on public issues."'168 One
commentator has reached this conclusion by analyzing the opinion in
the form of a syllogism which goes to the heart of the first amendment.
The central meaning of the [First] Amendment is that seditious libel cannot
be made the subject of government sanction. The Alabama rule on fair com-
ment is closely akin to making seditious libel an offense. The Alabama rule
therefore violated the central meaning of the Amendment. 169
It is highly doubtful that the Court will follow the direction of the
concurring opinions; as the majority most likely felt that the principles
set forth in these opinions would unfairly over-extend the qualified
privilege. They fail to give any consideration to the reputation of
the public official who should be provided with, at least, limited
165. Kalven, supra note 156, at 192.
166. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 163, at 297.
167. Id. at 292. "[Tlhe evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support a find-
ing that the statements referred to respondent [plaintiff]."
168. Kalven, supra note 156, at 209. See also Bemey, Libel and the First Amend-
ment-a New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REv. 1 (1955).
169. Kalven, supra note 156, at 209. For the first time the Sedition Act of 1798, 1
Stat. 596, was impliedly declared unconstitutional. "Although the Sedition Act was
never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court
of history." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 163, at 276 (footnote omitted).
The act expired in 1801.
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protection. That he assumes the cloak of office should not forfeit
his right to some recourse against the malicious lie. The value of a
good reputation is certainly of greater importance than the concurring
justices would allot to it. Freedom of expression concerning govern-
ment is the keystone to our democratic system, but the protection of
the individual should not be totally sacrificed in providing this privi-
lege to the critics of government and the public official.
The majority in Sullivan arrive at a much more equitable solution
by extending the privilege to the critic of public officials and govern-
ment, while still providing an official with a remedy for the calculated
or deliberate lie. The Court wisely refrained from extending to the
citizen-critic the absolute privilege which had previously been granted
to the public official in Barr v. Matteo.170 It might be argued that the
citizen should be granted the same immunity as the public official, but
this view fails to consider the unique position of the official in that
he could quite commonly find himself in the situation where it would
become necessary to make defamatory remarks in fulfilling his obliga-
tions to his office. The public official has a much greater need for
the absolute privilege than the citizen, for the citizen is not obligated
to make his statements. Even the newspaper publisher would never
find himself in a position where he is obligated to make a defamatory
statement as might be the case with the public official. One who
finds the defeasance of the privilege by proof of "actual malice" a
too restricted interpretation of the first amendment should note that
the plaintiff carries the burden of proving both the falsity of the
statements and the "actual malice" of defendant. The Court also held
that "actual malice" is a constitutional fact which is subject to a de
novo review. 71' This de novo review minimizes the hazard of an
erroneous finding of malice in a state court. 72
The majority opinion in Sullivan gives a new and strong meaning
to the first amendment by reversing the "long-standing ... rule of
common law that prevailed in a large majority of the states." 7 3
Like so many cases which establish a novel or revolutionary principle,
Sullivan and Garrison leave several sub-issues in a state of flux, 74
and only time and further litigation will provide the answers.
SAMUEL GRAY McNAmADA
170. 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1958). See text accompanying 35-36 supra.
171. See note 156 supra.
172. The de novo review is a valuable safeguard to the defendant who has been
convicted by a hostile judge and jury.
173. Kalven, supra note 156, at 220. See PnossEn § 110, at 814; RESTATEmmNT,
ToRTs § 598, comment a, at 261 (1938).
174. These unsettled areas of the law regarding defamation of public officials are
listed in the introduction of this article. See text following note 2 supra.
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